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Production of Referring Expressions
for an Unknown Audience: A
Computational Model of Communal
Common Ground
Roman Kutlak, Kees van Deemter * and Chris Mellish
Natural Language Generation Group, Computing Science Department, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK
This article presents a computational model of the production of referring expressions
under uncertainty over the hearer’s knowledge. Although situations where the hearer’s
knowledge is uncertain have seldom been addressed in the computational literature,
they are common in ordinary communication, for example when a writer addresses
an unknown audience, or when a speaker addresses a stranger. We propose
a computational model composed of three complimentary heuristics based on,
respectively, an estimation of the recipient’s knowledge, an estimation of the extent to
which a property is unexpected, and the question of what is the optimum number of
properties in a given situation. The model was tested in an experiment with human
readers, in which it was compared against the Incremental Algorithm and human-
produced descriptions. The results suggest that the new model outperforms the
Incremental Algorithm in terms of the proportion of correctly identified entities and in
terms of the perceived quality of the generated descriptions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A large body of research in psycholinguistics investigates the extent to which speakers tailor their
utterances to their addressees, a phenomenon known as audience design (Clark and Murphy, 1982;
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986b; Isaacs and Clark, 1987; Clark and Brennan, 1991). Referring
expressions (henceforth, REs) are a natural focus for research on audience design, because they
aim to identify a referent uniquely for an audience; if the RE includes information unknown to
the hearer, then the hearer may fail to know what or who the speaker talks about. To borrow an
example from Appelt (1985), if I tell you to get off the bus “one stop before I do,” then my reference
to the bus stop will tend to misfire, because you do not know where I will get off the bus. The link
between knowledge and reference makes REs a suitable focus for research on Audience Design. The
present article follows this well-trodden path, using computational models, and experiments with
human participants. Computational models will be employed because they are the most explicit
and detailed models of reference production that are currently on the market (see van Deemter,
2016; also Section 2 below); controlled experiments with human participants will help us ground
our computational model in actual human behavior.
Audience design is difficult at the best of times. This article focusses on a class of situations
in which the process is complicated further by the fact that the speaker addresses an unknown
audience, for example as when a novelist writes a book, or a scientist addresses a conference. In
these situations, the speaker/writer does not know exactly who is reading or listening, let alone
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what the listeners know; moreover, different listeners know
different things, hence a RE that works well for one listener might
work badly for another. For concreteness, we focus on REs that
serve to identify personalities in the public domain (i.e., famous
people); generalizations to other publicly known entities—such
as companies, towns, sports clubs, and so on—suggest themselves
naturally.
Thus, this article presents a computational model of
reference to famous people, under uncertainty about the hearer’s
knowledge. As will be explained, our model rests on three factors.
The first is the likelihood that a given property of the referent
is known; we call this the Knowledge factor. The second is the
degree to which a given property is distinctive or useful; we will
call this theUnexpectedness factor. The third is the completeness
of the RE; for reasons that will become clear later, we call this
the Termination factor. These three factors have never before
been combined yet they bear important conceptual similarities
to each other. For example, just as it is is important for a speaker
to know what her audience knows, it is important to know what
information is useful to her audience, and what amount of it
suffices. In the last analysis, these factors might all be seen as part
of what theoreticians have called Common Ground (e.g., Clark
andMarshall, 1981; Clark, 1996; Beaver, 1997; Vanderschraaf and
Sillari, 2009).
In the next section, we review the state of the art in
computational models of referring, and the extent to which
these models are able to capture the insights that have emerged
from psycholinguistic (Section 2). Next, we briefly sketch an
elicitation experiment that provides us with a corpus of human-
produced REs 3, allowing us to make some initial observations1.
Our computational model is presented in Section 4; it is
experimentally tested in Section 5 and the results are reported
in Section 6. The paper concludes with a discussion of the wider
implications of our findings (Section 7).
2. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF
REFERRING AND AUDIENCE DESIGN
Computational models of reference production are also known
as referring expression generation (REG) algorithms. Early REG
algorithms were, first and foremost, components of dialogue
systems (e.g., Winograd, 1972), where they ensure that entities
are described in ways that are intelligible to users. Early REG
algorithms were not informed by extensive experimentation
with human participants. Over the years, however, there has
been a gradual shift. First, computational linguists started to
incorporate some psycholinguistic findings, hoping this would
help them to create more effective referring expressions2. Soon
after that, REG algorithms started to be tested systematically,
for example in terms of the extent to which their output
resembles referring expressions produced by human speakers
(Passonneau, 1996; Gupta and Stent, 2005; van Deemter et al.,
1Additionally, as will be explained, this elicitation experiment will play a minor
technical role in our modeling of the Termination factor.
2For example, the Incremental Algorithm of Dale and Reiter (1995) was
inspired by Pechmann’s findings regarding incrementality (Pechmann, 1989) and
by Rosch’s work on basic-level values (Rosch, 1978).
2012). Essentially, this meant that REG algorithms were starting
to be seen as product models of human behavior, that is, models
that focus on the relation between inputs (i.e., the domain and
the intended referent) and outputs (i.e., the semantic content of
the referring expression), without making further claims about
the production process (Sun, 2008). Recent REG algorithms
are trying hard to simulate human reference production, by
modeling phenomena such as variation in language production
(Viethen andDale, 2010; Frank andGoodman, 2012; van Gompel
et al., 2012).
In what follows, we first summarize how Audience Design
has been understood by theoreticians, and what psychological
experiments have taught us about this phenomenon. Next,
we discuss to what extent existing REG algorithms address
Audience Design. After that, we turn to the challenge
outlined in Section 1, namely to model the problem of
Audience Design under uncertainty concerning the hearer’s
knowledge.
2.1. Audience Design in Human Reference
Production
Much of our understanding of reference production is based on
the idea of Information Sharing (van Deemter, 2016). To convey
the idea using a simple example, suppose our shared information
is represented in the Knowledge Base of below table. Suppose,
furthermore, I have new information for you about the animal
a: for example, that it is in a cage. To communicate this new
information to you, I can exploit our shared knowledge, telling
you, “the Kenyan lion is in a cage.”
Identifier Species Origin Weight Injuries
a Lion Kenya 102 kg Paws, teeth
b Lion China 100 kg Paws
c Tiger China 310 kg Back
After my utterance, my privileged information has shrunk, but
our shared information has increased because the fact that a is
in the cage is now part of it. Crucially, a different RE might have
been chosen, e.g., “The lion that weighs 102 kg.” The choice of
referring expression is what REG algorithms are concerned with.
Most authors on REG have written about Information Sharing
as if it hinged on what knowledge the speaker knows the hearer
to possess. Although this is an important part of it, psychologists,
logicians, and game theorists have argued that, strictly speaking,
information p is only shared between a set of agents (it is also
said to be “common knowledge,” or “in common ground”) if
all these agents know that p and that p is shared. To borrow
an example from Clark and Marshall, suppose I utter the RE
“the movie showing at the Roxy tonight” (Clark and Marshall,
1981). If you and I believe this is movie x, and I believe that you
believe it is x, but you believe that I believe it is movie y then you
will misunderstand me, because you think I’m referring to y. A
proposition p is only shared between you and me if I know that
p, you know that p, I know that you know that p, you know that I
know that p, and so on, using epistemic embeddings of arbitrary
depth.
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Researchers from a number of disciplines have contributed
to our understanding of Information Sharing (see Beaver, 1997
for a survey). The philosopher Robert Stalnaker, for example,
thought a felicitous utterance should normally fulfill two
conditions: it should be consistent with shared information
and it should add new information to it (Stalnaker, 1978).
This view has sometimes been challenged (e.g., Lewis,
1979 on the notion of accommodation), but it matches
the relatively simple situations on which REG research has
focussed.
To perform information sharing effectively requires the reader
to design her referring expressions in a way that allows the
hearer to understand what they refer to, a special case of a
phenomenon known as Audience Design. Speakers are not
always good at Audience Design. The ability in principle of most
adult human speakers to reason about “other minds” is well
attested, yet speakers and hearers frequently fail to realize exactly
what information is shared between them: the extent to which
we are able to assess what information is shared is the subject
of the so-called egocentricity debate. On one side of the debate
are psycholinguists who emphasize shared information and its
role in communication (e.g., Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986a;
Brennan and Clark, 1996). On the other side are researchers
whose experiments have sowed doubt about people’s ability to
take their knowledge about other minds into account when they
speak or listen (Horton and Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 2003;
Lane et al., 2006), even in situations where it has been made
abundantly clear to each interlocutor what the other one knows.
Some “doubters” compare our ability to take other minds into
account to a fancy espresso machine that you have been given
as a present: you own the machine (i.e., you are able to theorize
about other minds), yet you may not use it very often (Keysar
et al., 2003).
To date, the debate is unresolved, with different researchers
attaching different interpretations to experimental results. For
example, a study by Wu and Keysar focussed on speakers’
choices between names and descriptions (Wu and Keysar,
2007). Participants were shown unfamiliar complex shapes and
they were taught equally unfamiliar names for these shapes
(e.g., one was called Abypit). The authors found that speakers
frequently over-use names, tending to produce names where
they should have known that the listener had no chance
of knowing what they meant. This appeared to confirm the
suspicions of the “doubters.” However, in a recent follow-up,
Heller and colleagues re-examined Wu and Keysar’s experiment,
and concluded that speakers in that experiment were not over-
using names at all: when they used unfamiliar names, this
tended to be in situations where sufficient other information
was available to permit hearers to know what the name
referred to Heller et al. (2012). Essentially, Heller et al.
argue, speakers were teaching hearers the meanings of the
name.
Other publications in this area have given rise to similar
discussions, with critics arguing that experimental participants
had been put in unusual situations (Brown-Schmidt, 2009).
Instead of exploring these issues further, let us see how the
reference task can be formulated as part of a computational
model.
2.2. Audience Design in Existing REG
Algorithms
In accordance with longstanding usage going back to the work of
J.S. Mill in the 19th century, we call the set of elements that have
a property P the extension of P, abbreviated [[P]]. Given is a finite
domain involving a set M of entities; what entities M contains
is shared information between the speaker and the hearer. M
contains an element rǫM, the target referent. Given are also one
or more other elements, the distractors, and a set P of atomic
properties, whose extension is shared information between the
speaker and the hearer. The REG task may be defined as follows:
The REG task If there exists a subset {P1, .., Pn} of P such that
[[P1]] ∩ ... ∩ [[Pn]] = {r} (so r is the only element in M of which
each of these n properties holds true), then REG needs to find
such a set. The algorithm needs to make sure that the properties
P1, ..., Pn permit the generation of a RE that is optimally similar to
REs produced by human speakers in comparable situations.
Following Dale and Haddock (1991), both the set of properties
{P1, .., Pn} and the RE that puts the properties into words is called
distinguishing description. A distinguishing description is thus a
set of properties whose conjunction is true of the referent but
not of any other entity in the domain; other entities are called
distractors. We focus here on algorithms that produce “one-shot”
descriptions, that is, which disregard any prior utterances.
Existing REG algorithms have used these ideas in different
ways. Some early algorithms generate descriptions that are
minimally distinguishing (i.e., containing the minimum number
of properties), but speakers frequently include additional
information (e.g., Levelt, 1989; more recently Arts, 2004;
Engelhardt et al., 2006; Koolen et al., 2011). Observations of this
kind led to the Incremental Algorithm (IA) (Dale and Reiter,
1995), which assumes the existence an ordered list of attributes,
known as a Preference Order. The notion of a Preference Order
formalizes the idea that some attributes are more likely to be
used than others, for instance because they have high utility, or
high “codability” (Belke and Meyer, 2002). Color, for example,
is thought to have high codability, and this explains the fact that
referring expressions frequently contain color in situations where
the referent could already be identified by the hearer (i.e., the
use of color was logically superfluous). The IA produces different
output depending on what Preference Order it uses.
The IA generates a description of a referent r in the following
way: The algorithm takes the first attribute from the Preference
Order and selects the most attribute that removes the most
distractors. If the property rules out one or more distractors, it is
added to the referring expression; otherwise it is not added, and
the next attribute in the preference order is examined. Crucially,
the algorithm terminates when properties P1, .., Pn have been
selected such that [[P1]] ∩ ... ∩ [[Pn]] = {r}. In other words,
the algorithm ends when the algorithms calculates that the hearer
is able to identify the referent, and this is where, arguably, it
performs Audience Design. When the algorithm terminates, the
description resulting from it is inspected to see whether another
property needs to be added: if the description does not contain a
property whose attribute is type, one such property is added to
ensure that the description contains a noun.
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2.2.1. Example
Suppose a domain contains three chairs a, b, c, whose color and
size are defined. Suppose a and b are red, while c is brown.
Furthermore, a is large, whereas b and c are small. Suppose a is
the referent, and the Preference Order is [color, size]. Then the
IA starts examining the most highly preferred attribute, color,
selecting red. Although this property rules out the distractor c,
it does not rule out b, so the referring expression is not finished
yet, and another property needs to be selected. The next property
selected is large, ruling out the distractor b. Both distractors have
been ruled out now, and the type of the object is added, that is
chair. Later processes decide what words to employ for expressing
these three concepts, as in “the large red chair.” Neither is
a minimally distinguishing description, since “the large chair”
would have been unambiguous.
Dale and Reiter hinted at something like Audience Design
(without using the term). Their idea was that when the IA
asks whether a property rules out any distractors, the answer
is given on the basis of what the speakers believes to be the
hearer’s knowledge about each domain object (Dale and Reiter,
1995, Section 2.3). The IA does not offer a mechanism for
assessing the hearer’s knowledge. In practice, when implemented,
the algorithm invariably uses a simple database of facts (as in our
Example above). Clearly, it was not the authors’ aim to offer an
account of Common Ground.
A model that considers the hearer’s knowledge to a slightly
greater extent is Horacek (2005). Horacek identifies three types
of uncertainty: knowledge, perception capabilities and conceptual
agreement. Uncertainty about knowledge occurs when a property
may not be known or recognized by the hearer; for example,
if the speaker says “the Basset Hound,” the hearer may not be
able to tell a Basset Hound from other dog breeds. Uncertainty
about perception arises, for example, if the hearer does not view
a scene from the same position as the speaker, so some properties
(e.g., a dog’s tail) might be hidden from view. Conceptual
agreement uncertainties occur when there is a chance that the
speaker conceptualizes a property differently from the hearer;
for example, the speaker might describe an object as turquoise
whereas the hearer would describe it as blue.
Horacek (2005) augments the Incremental Algorithm by
taking these three types of uncertainty into account. Each
property has three probabilities associated with it, one for each
of the three types of uncertainty. These three probabilities are
combined into one overall probability which helps to determine
whether the property in question will become part of the referring
expression generated by the algorithm. Although Horacek
focussed on very small domains and did not test his algorithm
empirically, his work indicates a possible approach to generating
definite descriptions under uncertainty. A difficulty is that it is
unclear how the necessary probabilities in Horacek’s algorithm
should be estimated. Our own algorithm (Section 4), by contrast,
has computational methods for estimating probabilities at its
heart.
2.3. Audience Design in REG: The
Challenge Ahead
Considerable effort has been invested in experiments that test
the ability of REG algorithms to mimic the REs produced by
human speakers (Gatt and Belz, 2010). Almost invariably, these
tests have focussed on communicative situations in which it is
straightforward to determine what properties are in the Common
Ground of the speaker and the hearer. The typical setup of these
experiments has been to elicit REs from speakers who are either
together in a room with the hearer observing the same visual
domain, or they are asked to imagine that they are. Herb Clark
described situations of this kind as involving “triple copresence”
and observed that these situations make it easy for people to
understand what information is in Common Ground.
Although a limited amount of research discusses situations
in which the hearer has to make an effort to find out
what information is in Common Ground (Garoufi and Koller,
2014a; Paraboni and van Deemter, 2014a), we are unaware of
computational models of situations—such as those discussed
by Keysar and colleagues—where “egocentric” speakers struggle
to realize what is in Common Ground. To mimic speakers’
behavior in such situations, a computational model would have to
behave as if it has a tenuous grasp of Common Ground, avoiding
privileged information in some situations but not in other similar
situations; after all, speakers are not unable to understand that
the hearer’s knowledge differs from their own—they do “get it
right” some of the time. To capture this fluctuating behavior, a
probabilistic model may have to be designed, which does not
always produce the same referring expression in a given situation
(Holden and van Orden, 2009; van Deemter, 2016, chapter 6). To
do this, however, is not the aim of the present paper.
The problem to which we are about to turn has relevance
for the much-debated problem of egocentricity, but instead of
examining cleverly designed situations in which speakers know
very well what the hearer knows but sometimes fail to apply
this knowledge, we study the situations discussed in Section 1,
where speakers do not have sufficient information to judge what
their hearers know. As the domain of our study, we chose
the domain of famous people. This vast domain forces speaker
to guess what properties are likely to be known by hearers.
Moreover, the naturalness of the domain allows experimentation
with participants without any special training. Finally, this is a
domain for which some computational resources exist (such as
DBpedia, see Section 4.2) that will prove to be important for the
construction of our model.
Our approach owes a debt to Clark andMarshall’s insight, that
people manage to communicate even in the absence of triple co-
presence. These authors suggested that two mechanisms can help
us to estimate Common Ground. The first mechanism operates
when information is publicly announced, and is called Linguistic
Common Ground. For example, when information is broadcast
on a train, then this information is accessible to all passengers, so
it might be reasonable to assume that it is on Common Ground
(barring background noise and lack of attention). The second
mechanism operates when people from the same community are
exposed to broadly the same sources of information. Residents
of Paris, for example, expect other residents to know where the
Eiffel Tower is, and they expect other residents to know that they
know this, and so on. In connection with situations of this kind,
Clark andMarshall coined the term communalCommonGround
(Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1996): “common ground based
on community membership.”
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Linguistic and communal Common Ground can only estimate
Common Ground, because they do not offer an absolute
guarantee that each member of the community knows that
each member of the community possesses the information
involved. Estimation is, accordingly, an important feature of the
computational models that will be discussed later in this paper.
These models will focus on communal Common Ground. The
reader may recall that we are focussing on referring expressions
that refer in one shot (i.e., disregarding linguistic context).
Algorithms that produce REs in linguistic context might be seen
as modeling linguistic Common Ground; of particular interest
in this connection are models in which an algorithm similar to
the ones discussed in Section 2.2 are applied to situations in
which the shared knowledge base is essentially a piece of text
(Siddharthan and Copestake, 2004).
3. INITIAL EXPLORATION: ELICITING A
CORPUS OF RES
To gain an initial insight in the descriptions produced by human
speakers, we elicited a corpus of descriptions of famous people
(Kutlak et al., 2011), using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk),
a platform where tasks can be posted that are completed by
volunteers for a small financial reward. Participants were told
about a game where a speaker produces descriptions of a famous
person and a hearer has to guess the name of the person
described. Participants were told that the hearer has one attempt
to guess the name of the person described and the descriptions
produced should help the hearer to identify the described person.
Participants were then presented with names of famous people
and primed to produce definite descriptions by completing the
sentence, “This person was the. . . ”. Table 1 shows some of the
215 descriptions produced by 29 participants. Participants were
self-identified native English speakers whose registered address
was in the US or the UK (see Kutlak et al., 2011 for more details).
Informal analysis of the corpus suggested to us that many
descriptions of the same person share a common core of
properties. For example, all descriptions of Edison said he
invented the light bulb; half of the descriptions ofHillary Clinton
mentioned that she was a former First Lady. Far from being
idiosyncratic, the bulk of the properties employed seemed to
be ones that are widely known. This observation set us on a
path to designing a knowledge heuristic, which estimates what
information people are likely to know (Section 4.1).
Secondly, many of the properties mentioned in a description
were quite unusual with respect to the general population.
Examples of such properties are the inventor of the telephone and
received a Nobel Prize. This is to be expected, because participants
were asked to produce descriptions that allow hearers to guess
the name of the person described. However, it also suggests
that if one wants to simulate human behavior, one might take
into consideration how unusual a property is. In other words,
although properties should be widely known, they should also
be unusual or unexpected. This suggests a second heuristic, for
which we use the term unexpectedness. In other words, we
hypothesized that descriptions should avoid properties that are
unexpected yet little known (e.g., the Warden of the British Royal
Mint in 16963), but also properties that are widely known but too
common to be useful (e.g., the person who had arms and legs. . . ).
Finally, many descriptions in the corpus were multiply over-
specified in the sense that they contained multiple properties that
could be omitted without stopping the description from being
distinguishing. For example, the description “This person was the
author of The OldMan and the Sea, The Sun Also Rises, ForWhom
the Bell Tolls, and other famous novels” contains three properties,
each of which identifies Hemingway uniquely. Perhaps because
participants did not know what the hearers knew, they included
extra properties to increase the chance that the hearer identify
the referent. To produce a minimally distinguishing description
would be to gamble, but it is not obvious how much over-
specification is required. We use the term termination to refer
to the factor determining how long the REG algorithm should
continue adding properties to the description.
4. THE COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
Reflecting the insights of the previous section, our computational
model of reference production is composed of three heuristics,
each of which corresponds to one of the factors discussed above.
3Isaac Newton.
TABLE 1 | A sample of referent names and corresponding descriptions in the corpus.
Name Description
Albert Einstein This person was the author of the theory of relativity
This person was the physicist who developed the Theory of Relativity that revolutionized how we understand space, time, and gravity
This person was the German-American mathematician
Thomas Edison This person invented the light bulb
This person was most famous for his inventions of the light blub and the phonograph
This person was the inventor of the light bulb, phonograph, and movie projector
Elvis Presley This person was the King of Rock “n” Roll
This person was the King of Rock and Roll, born in Tupelo, Mississippi, who had Graceland built
This person was one of the most popular singers ever, with hits including Blue Suede Shoes and Jailhouse Rock
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This heuristic-based approach makes the model transparent,
because one can see what each heuristic contributes (though of
course we have no evidence that they have separate reality in the
humanmind). Having individual heuristics also makes the model
more extensible, because new heuristics can easily be added. For
example, the model could be extended by a heuristic that takes
into account the context in which the description appears.
A general remark about the way in which our three heuristics
were developed is in order. There are many ways in which the
loosely explained ideas of the previous sectionmay be turned into
precisely defined metrics that can be applied to actual data. The
danger of testing hypotheses involving a large number of metrics
is that the risk of type I errors (false positives) is considerable.
Our solution to this problem was to use a two-stage approach.
During the first stage, we implemented a number of metrics that
appeared to be plausible on the basis of earlier work, and we did
a pilot test on all of them. During the second stage, those metric
that performed best during the pilot were tested again, using a
new set of stimuli. Anymetrics that achieved a good performance
by a chance during the first stage are likely to fail during the
second. This approach allowed us to test a large number of
options while keeping the risk of type I errors low.
4.1. Knowledge Heuristic
In order to generate useful descriptions of people, the
computational model should select properties that are known by
the hearers, and this involves estimating hearers’ knowledge. We
take as our starting point the idea that speakers use community
membership to estimate what hearers know (Clark and Marshall,
1981). Experimental evidence shows that speakers are often able
to distinguish between knowledge that is available to members
of specific communities or to outsiders. For example, Krauss
and Fussell (1991) cite an experiment by Kingsbury (1968), who
asked random pedestrians in Boston for directions to a local
department store. Kingsbury asked one third of his subjects (a)
“Can you tell me how to get to Jordan-Marsh?” using a local
dialect, one third (b) “I’m from out of town. Can you tell me
how to get to Jordan-Marsh?” using the same dialect, and one
third (c) “Can you tell me how to get to Jordan-Marsh?” using
his native rural Missouri—a dialect not often heard in Boston.
Respondents in groups (b) and (c) provided longer and more
detailed responses than in group (a). Related conclusions can be
drawn from Bromme et al. (2001) and Nickerson et al. (1987).
Our hypothesis is that the knowledge of a community can be
estimated by examining documents produced by the community:
the more frequently a fact is mentioned, the more likely are
the members of the community to know this fact. This may be
motivated by two considerations: firstly, an author who reports
a fact will tend to know this fact; secondly, if a fact is recorded
frequently, then it may be read often, making it more likely to be
remembered (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968).
Given our hypothesis, two additional things are required: (a)
a corpus of documents that represents the target community,
and (b) a metric that allows us to calculate how likely it is that
addressees know a given fact. As our corpus, we used the World
Wide Web, and to gain information from it we used the search
engine Google. The World Wide Web has been successfully
used as a corpus before (e.g., Turney, 2001; Keller and Lapata,
2003). The advantage of using a search engine such as Google
is its ability to take synonyms and morphological variations
into account and to ignore irrelevant words that separate the
search terms. Since our queries will use English search terms,
the documents retrieved by the search engine are also in English,
so we hypothesize that they represent the community of those
English speakers who regularly access the World Wide Web.
To implement the Knowledge Heuristic, we experimented
with a number of computational metrics of co-occurrence based
on the counts of documents containing certain facts, or metrics
based on probabilities derived from these counts. Below, we
list the four metrics that performed best in our pilot (“stage
1”) experiment, all of which are existing metrics for measuring
the strength of association between words. Each of the metrics
assumes that a context for the words has been defined. These
contexts are often defined as a limited number of words before
or after the target word or a short frame such as a paragraph
in which the target word occurs, but this is not suitable for
our purpose, because a fact about a person can be mentioned
further away from the person’s name, especially if the name is
pronominalized in consequent paragraphs. Therefore, we used as
our context the entire page returned by the search engine.
4.1.1. Frequency
The simplest measure of association between a person and a
property (a fact about a person) is the frequency of occurrence
of the name and the property together in a corpus. Taking a
collection of documents as a corpus, frequency corresponds to
the count of articles that contain the name and the property. This
association is then the value of count(n, p) where n stands for the
name of an entity and p is the property in question.
4.1.2. Conditional Probability
More sophisticated measures are conditional probabilities as
in Equations (1) and (2), where Equation (1) measures the
probability of occurrence of the name given that a property
occurs, and Equation (2) measures the probability of occurrence
of a property given that the name of the person occurs. While the
former measure normalizes the results by the frequency of the
property, the later measure takes into account how famous each
person is.
assocprob(n, p) = P(n|p) =
count(n, p)
count(p)
(1)
assocprob(p, n) = P(p|n) =
count(p, n)
count(n)
(2)
4.1.3. Pointwise Mutual Information
(PMI) Fano (1961) compares how often two events x and y occur
together. PMI exploits the fact that if two terms appear together
often, their joint probability (P(n, p)) will be higher than if they
were independent (P(n)P(p)). The value of PMI is positive for
terms that co-occur and negative otherwise.
assocPMI(n, p) = log2
P(n, p)
P(n)P(p)
(3)
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• Albert Einstein
• Bill Gates
• Christopher Columbus
• Elvis Presley
• John F. Kennedy
• Julia Roberts
• Marilyn Monroe
• Princess Diana
• Sigmund Freud
• William Shakespeare
FIGURE 1 | Names of famous people used in the pilot test of the
potential metrics for the Knowledge Heuristic.
A problem with PMI is that infrequent words that only
appear together achieve a disproportionately high score. This is
undesirable, because in order for a property to be in common
ground, it also has to be frequently mentioned. To mitigate
this type of problem, Hodges et al. (1996) suggest multiplying
each PMI score by count(n, p). To balance out the large
differences between the frequencies of frequent items (hundreds
of thousands of results) and less frequent items (hundreds of
results), we multiply the PMI score by the square root of the
count. The final formula used for calculating the association is
as in Equation (4).
assocPMI(n, p) =
√
count(n, p) ∗ log2
P(n, p)
P(n)P(p)
(4)
These four metrics were first tested in a pilot experiment and the
best performing metric was then re-tested (in what we call the
“main experiment” in this section) using a different set of stimuli.
Given that the setup of the pilot and the main experiment
was essentially identical, we describe the the method and the
procedure only once. Participants, materials, and results are
reported separately for both the pilot and the main experiment.
4.1.4. Materials and Method of the Pilot Experiment
For the pilot experiment, we selected 10 people, each of whom
was famous enough that his/her name occurred on the BBC
Historical Figures page4. The 10 people were selected in such a
way that they varied in terms of how well known they were likely
to be. The names of the selected people are listed in Figure 1.
For each referent we selected information fromWikipedia and
the BBC Historical Figures pages. We used our own judgment
(informed by the frequencies of properties from the corpus
described in the previous section) to select properties that
covered a range of likelihoods of being known. That is, for each
referent, we selected a number of properties that were likely to
be known by anyone who knows the referent (e.g., the referent’s
occupation), and properties that were likely to be known only by
people who have a more detailed knowledge of the referent.
For each referent, we included 5 filler properties that were
not true of the referent. Each trial contained 5 true properties
and 5 filler properties for each person, presented in randomized
order. This resulted in a total of 100 statements (10 referents, 10
properties each). To keep the task manageable, statements were
randomly split into 5 groups of 20 statements.
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/
TABLE 2 | List of properties true of Albert Einstein.
Property Percentage Frequency Rank
Albert Einstein was a physicist 80.95 827000 4.00
Albert Einstein invented the theory of
relativity
80.43 69600 3.00
Albert Einstein was German 67.39 1060000 5.00
Albert Einstein emigrated to the United
States
47.06 20200 2.00
Albert Einstein was a professor at the
Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague
30.30 652 1.00
The percentage of affirmative answers show what percentage of participants believed the
statement to be true. Rank shows how the corresponding properties ranked according
to the Knowledge Heuristic. Spearman correlation between percentage and frequency
rs(48) = 0.67;p < 0.001.
4.1.5. Participants and Procedure of the Pilot
Experiment
The pilot experiment was conducted online using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to ensure a large number of
participants. A total of 755 MTurk users started the experiment,
but only 216 completed the experiment5. A further 12 were
removed because the number of errors (counted as answering
“true” to a false statement or vice versa) was higher than 5 (avg.+
SD). The resulting dataset contained 4080 answers produced by
204 participants (78 female, 126 male).
The first screen showed instructions on how to answer and
how to navigate the website and also urged the participants to
rely on their own knowledge and avoid using external resources
to answer the questions. The participants were then asked to fill in
some information such as their sex, age group and interests. The
participants were then randomly assigned to one of the groups.
The participants viewed one statement at a time and were asked
to select one of the options (true, don’t know, false).
Participants could also add a comment to each statement; at the
end of the experiment they were given an opportunity to offer
additional open comments.
4.1.6. Results of the Pilot Experiment
The responses from participants were aggregated per statement,
resulting in each statement having a percentage of affirmative
answers (answers where participants selected true). Only true
statements were analyzed.Table 2 shows example statements and
their scores for Albert Einstein.
Table 3 shows correlations between the metrics and the
percentages of affirmative answers calculated from participants’
answers. Frequency, p|n and PMI performed very well. Given
the simplicity and the performance of the Frequency metric, we
decided to chose this metric for the Knowledge Heuristic, where
its performance in conjunction with the other metrics was to be
tested.
4.1.7. Materials of the Main Experiment
Similarly to the pilot experiment, we selected 10 famous figures
(see Figure 2), each of whom was famous enough that their
5Investigation of the large number of incomplete answers and potential issues of
data quality are addressed in Section 4.1.8.
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TABLE 3 | Pilot results: Spearman correlation between the metrics and
knowledge of hearers.
Frequency n|p p|n PMI
rs(48) 0.667 −0.063 0.672 0.628
p-value 0.000 0.663 0.000 0.000
• Admiral Nelson
• Alfred Nobel
• Andy Warhol
• Duke of Wellington
• Emperor Hirohito
• Ernest Hemingway
• Florence Nightingale
• Heinrich Himmler
• Louis Pasteur
• Plato
FIGURE 2 | Names of famous people used in the test of the Knowledge
Heuristic.
names occurred on the BBC Historical Figures page6. Each trial
contained 7 true properties and 5 filler properties for each person,
presented in randomized order. This resulted in a total of 120
statements (10 referents, 12 properties each). The statements
were also randomly split into 5 groups of 24 statements (14 true,
10 false in each group).
4.1.8. Participants of the Main Experiment
The main experiment involving the Knowledge Heuristic was
likewise conducted online using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). The pilot experiment had a large proportion of users
from India. Given that the experiment required knowledge of
“western” culture, we decided to limit the main experiment
to US and UK MTurkers. Furthermore, participants also had
to successfully pass a cloze test (Stubbs and Tucker, 1974),
guaranteeing that only highly fluent speakers of English would
pass.
The main experiment was undertaken by 71 English speakers.
5 were discarded because they did not finish the experiment and
a further 5 participants were removed because the number of
errors they made was more than 4 (mean + 2 ∗ SD). The total
number of participants was 61; of these, 30 females, 29 males and
2 unspecified.
4.1.9. Results and Discussion of the Main Experiment
Answers were aggregated by statement and the resulting
percentages were correlated with scores assigned by the
Knowledge Heuristic. Table 4 shows examples of the statements
used in the experiment, along with the percentages of answers
where participants selected true and the ranks assigned by the
Knowledge Heuristic. The search queries were run in June 2014.
We found a high correlation between the estimates produced by
the heuristic and the percentage of people who knew given facts
[rs(68) = 0.73; p < 0.001]. The heuristic performs very well if
we compare the results of the heuristic with the correlation of
estimated and actual knowledge of human speakers as reported
in Fussell and Krauss (1992). In their experiments, Fussell and
Krauss report that the average correlation of people’s estimate
of knowledge of others and their actual knowledge was 0.67
6http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/
TABLE 4 | List of properties of Ernest Hemingway.
Property Condition Percentage Rank
Ernest Hemingway was a writer True 100.0 1
Ernest Hemingway was American True 100.0 2
Ernest Hemingway received the Nobel
Prize in Literature
True 63.6 5
Ernest Hemingway is the author of For
whom the bell tolls
True 54.5 4
Ernest Hemingway committed a suicide True 50.0 3
Ernest Hemingway was British False 27.3 –
Ernest Hemingway was born in Oak
Park
True 25.0 6
Ernest Hemingway received the Italian
Silver Medal of Bravery
True 20.0 7
Ernest Hemingway is the author of A
tale of two cities
False 13.3 –
Ernest Hemingway invented dynamite False 0.0 –
Ernest Hemingway died in a plane
crash
False 0.0 –
Ernest Hemingway was born in Paris False 0.0 –
Condition shows whether a property was true or false (a filler) and the percentage of
affirmative answers shows what percentage of participants believed the statement to be
true. Rank shows how the corresponding properties ranked according to the Knowledge
Heuristic. Spearman correlation between percentage and rank rs(68) = 0.73;p < 0.001.
(note that this was a Pearson correlation and our results report
a Spearman correlation).
These results suggested to us that our Knowledge Heuristic
is a viable starting point for a computational model of people’s
knowledge. Note that, strictly speaking, our heuristic was not
tested in terms of its ability to capture Common Ground.
After all, for a proposition to be in Common Ground (in the
strict sense) between all members of a community, it is not
sufficient for the proposition to be known by all members:
additionally, all members should know that the proposition is
in Common Ground; the recursion in this formulation implies
an infinite sequence of epistemic iterations (Section 3). Testing
our heuristic’s ability to capture classic Common Ground would
have been very difficult, which is why we settled for a simpler test.
Whether this leads to a heuristic that is useful for our purposes is
something we were only able to determine when our complete
model was tested (Section 5).
However, the Knowledge Heuristic is not sufficient for
producing referring expressions, because it does not take into
account whether a piece of information is distinguishing. For
example, if the heuristic had to decide between properties such
as X is a scientist and X is a physicist, it would assign a higher
score to the former. The next section will discuss a heuristic that
will balance this deficit.
4.2. Unexpectedness Heuristic
The analysis of the corpus showed that some of the properties
selected by human speakers are unexpected with respect to the
population as a whole (e.g., “inventor of dynamite,” “received a
Nobel prize”). In order to tell the unexpected properties apart
from the more common ones, it would be instructive to look
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at DBpedia. DBpedia is an ontology derived from Wikipedia,
a free encyclopedia created by the community of its users.
DBpedia extracts some of the information available as free text
in Wikipedia and encodes it in machine-readable form. The data
is ontologically structured, for example Physicist is a subclass
of Scientist, and Scientist is a subclass of Person; this
information would be difficult to infer from free text. DBpedia
suits REG algorithms as it describes each entity by means of
properties in the form 〈attribute:value〉. Furthermore, each entity
in DBpedia has a type (e.g., 〈type : person〉 or 〈type : scientist〉),
which is something many REG algorithms require, as we have
seen in Section 2.2.
Finding the right unexpectedness heuristic proved to be
challenging. We are interested in properties that are unexpected
for our audience. For example, being awarded the Nobel prize
is unexpected because only a handful of people receive this
prize every year; on the other hand, having a mother is
expected as everyone has a mother. Some REG algorithms
achieve unexpectedness by selecting properties that are highly
discriminating, as defined by Dale’s Discriminatory Power (DP;
Dale, 1992). The DP of a property is defined as (N − n)/(N −
1) where N is the total number of entities and n the number
of entities with a given property. The result of the function
takes values between 0 (the property is true for all entities in
the context, hence it is not discriminating at all) and 1 (the
property is true for only 1 entity in the context, hence it is highly
discriminating).
As we are aiming for interesting properties, rather than
distinguishing one, DP seemed to be less suitable. One of the
problems with DP is the uniform treatment of properties across
entity types. For example, in the case of our people domain, a
property such as 〈Nobelprize : literature〉 has almost exactly the
same score for a writer and a physicist, which is undesirable. A
second problem with DP relates to the context we used it in.
Although DBpedia contains millions of entities, the properties
are very sparse, therefore DP scores many properties very highly:
the DP tends to place many properties close to 1; as a result, it
does not provide a lot of information about these properties.
One field that studies the recognition of unusual patterns is
data mining. Geng and Hamilton (2006) performed an extensive
survey of statistical measures of interestingness and categorized
them into concepts such as surprisingness, peculiarity, utility,
etc. Surprisingness or unexpectedness was typically defined
in terms of contradicting a person’s existing knowledge or
expectations; formalizations of this idea often make use of
conditional probability; for example, winning a Nobel Prize may
be unexpected (even) for a physicist because the probability
P(Nobel | Physicist) is low.
To test the ability of a metric to measure unexpectedness,
we conducted an experiment similar to the one on the quality
of expressions in Section 5.3. Participants were told: “Imagine
your friend tells you he has read something interesting about a
person. He tells you the name of the person, but you’ve never come
across the name, so you ask who this is. Your friend wonders what
to tell you about this person. Please rate, for each of the facts
below, how interesting you would find this fact. Please rate each
fact individually (i.e., in isolation from the other facts in the list).”
We tested over 30 statistical measures from Geng and Hamilton
(2006) but our pilot found no reliable correlation between the
predictions of a metric and people’s judgements.
While we were unable to find a metric that performed well
on its own, we were able to use our experience with the 30
existing metrics to construct a new metric that showed good
results when combined with the Knowledge Heuristic. The
metric described by Equation (5) has a greater range of values
than DP, as can be seen from Table 5, assigning higher scores
than DP to properties that are less frequent. For instance, in
Table 5, 〈type:astronaut〉 is much more unexpected than
〈type:scientist〉 according to this metric than according
to DP, which we believe to be as it should be (i.e., intuitively,
astronaut is a more interesting property than scientist). Unlike
DP, our formula looks at a property B of a referent in connection
with the type of the referent, A.
Scoreunexpectedness(A,B) =
P(AB)/P(A)P(B)√
P(A)P(B)P(¬A)P(¬B) (5)
4.3. Termination Heuristic
The last heuristic determines how much information should be
included in a description. Like most REG models (Section 2.2),
our algorithm will add properties one by one. Consequently, the
number of properties in the description generated depends on
when the algorithm terminates. For this reason, we refer to this
as termination. As we have seen in the corpus, human-produced
descriptions often contain several properties that are uniquely
distinguishing on their own. Using the traditional approach
of terminating when all distractors are ruled out would never
produce such descriptions.
As with other heuristics, we tested several methods for
terminating the algorithm. Assuming that documents produced
by a community can tell us something about the knowledge
of the community, we focused on document-retrieval based
methods. The intuition was that retrieving documents that
contain properties listed in a description can tell us something
about the distractors that the audience is likely to be aware of.
For example, if our description contained the properties “singer”
and “rock ’n’ roll,” a large number of documents would match this
description. If the description also contained the property “singer
of Jailhouse Rock,” the set of matching documents would be much
smaller. Three methods were tested. Each time a property was
added to a description, the Google search engine was queried
using the new description; the search engine returned the number
of results plus snippets of text from each document retrieved.
TABLE 5 | Unexpectedness of some properties, by Equation (5) and by DP,
calculated across DBpedia.
Property Unexpectedness
(Equation 5)
Discriminatory Power
〈type:thing〉 0 0.0
〈type:person〉 11 0.6233
〈type:scientist〉 89 0.9962
〈type:astronaut〉 430 0.9998
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1275
Kutlak et al. Production of Referring Expressions for an Unknown Audience
The first method is based on the frequency with which the
name of the referent occurs in the documents retrieved when a
given description is used as a query. The algorithm constructs a
description by adding properties to it. At each stage, the method
focusses on the description under construction and examines the
snippets returned by the search engine (given that the description
is used as a query) and counts what percentage of the snippets
contain the name of the intended referent. If this percentage
crosses a threshold, the algorithm terminates; otherwise, a further
property is added to the description. The process repeats until the
threshold is crossed or the description contains the maximum
number of properties. Based on our analysis of the corpus in
Section 3, the maximum number we allowed was 7 (average +
2 SD).
The second method uses only the counts of the results (i.e.,
documents returned) that contain the name of the target referent;
let’s call this number N. As in the first method, every time the
algorithm adds a new property to the description, the search
engine is queried using that description. The number of results
will decrease, since fewer and fewer documents match the query.
As soon as the number of results falls below a pre-determined
fraction of N (or when it reaches the maximum number of
properties), the algorithm terminates.
The third method used the differences between the numbers
of retrieved documents as a description is being created (i.e., the
slope of the graph). Initially, every addition of a property results
in a large reduction in the number of results, but as the number
of properties in a description increases, the reduction becomes
smaller. The heuristic uses this observation to decide whether a
description contains enough properties. As soon as the addition
of a property does not result in a large difference in the number of
matching documents, the heuristic terminates the algorithm. The
meaning of “large” is determined by a predetermined threshold.
The full heuristic is described by Figure 3.
All thresholds were based on the counts of documents
containing the name of the referent and an empirically
determined coefficient. The reason for using the number of
documents containing the referent is that the amount of content
needed to describe a person is related to how well known the
person is. It seems plausible that very famous people require
fewer properties to identify them than less known people will
require. The coefficients were derived from a subset of the corpus
described in Section 3 annotated with semantic properties.
The three methods were tested using the corpus of Section 3.
Each method took as an input the name of the referent and
a list of properties that human participants had written to
describe the referent, ordered from most to least frequent.
The length of the description produced by each method was
compared against the average length of all descriptions of a given
referent. The score of the description created by the heuristic was
calculated using (Equation 6), a standard z-score, where µi is the
average length of the descriptions of i, and σi is their standard
deviation:
score(descriptioni) =
|µi − length(descriptioni)|
σi
(6)
FIGURE 3 | Pseudocode describing the termination heuristic. The
heuristic returns true (and terminates the algorithm) when adding a property
to a description does not result in a large decrease in the number of matching
documents.
The third method produced the best results, with an average
score of 0.98. The average number of properties per description
produced by people was 3.349 with SD = 1.754 and the average
number of properties selected by the termination heuristic
was 3.41 with SD = 1.34. This heuristic was selected for the
final computational model. The heuristic is described using
pseudocode in Figure 3.
4.4. Combining the Three Heuristics
The above heuristics were combined as in Figure 4.
The algorithms start by calling the function
MakeReferringExpression and passing as parameters the
referent and a list of properties true of the referent. An initially
empty list D is created, which will later contain the properties
used in a description. A score is assigned to each property,
based on the combination of the Knowledge Heuristic and the
Unexpectedness Heuristic. A loop is then entered where the
property with the highest score is taken and removed from the
list. Next, it is checked whether the algorithm should terminate.
If the Termination Heuristic returns true, the algorithm
returns the list D as the final description. If the Termination
Heuristic returns false, the algorithm adds the current property
into the list D and loops back to selecting the next property
with the highest score. The loop repeats until the Termination
Heuristic stops the algorithm.
The score for each property is calculated as follows. Each
property is tested by the Knowledge Heuristic and the
Unexpectedness Heuristic. The scores assigned by each heuristic
are scaled to range between [0–1] using the function Scale. The
reason for scaling the values is that each heuristic is using a
different scale. (Taking an average would not make sense if, for
example, the Knowledge Heuristic produced values between
0 and 1012 and the Unexpectedness Heuristic would produce
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FIGURE 4 | Pseudocode for algorithms Alg1 and Alg2 .
scores between 0 and 1). The function for calculating the score of
a property is described in Figure 4.
The algorithm is similar in some ways to the Greedy Heuristic
(Dale, 1989) because it always chooses the “best” property
(based on the three heuristics). Unlike the Greedy Heuristic, our
algorithm does not re-calculate the scores of the properties after
each iteration. In this regard, the algorithm is more similar to the
IA because once the properties are ordered by the heuristics, the
order does not change. Unlike the IA, however, the preference is
computed for each referent individually.
We also tested a baseline heuristic for terminating the
algorithm based on the average number of properties in the
human produced descriptions, which is 3. This baseline is not
sensitive to the content of the description, risking descriptions
that are too general to allow identification. Our experiment in
Section 5 therefore tests two different versions of the algorithm:
both used the Knowledge Heuristic and Unexpectedness
Heuristic to rank the properties but Alg1 used always 3
properties per description whereas Alg2 used the document-
retrieval based termination heuristic.
5. EVALUATING THE MODEL
Evaluation of the model focused on three aspects of the
descriptions produced. We decided that the main aspect to focus
on was the number of successfully identified referents, because
identification is the main purpose of referring. The second aspect
was naturalness, defined by the statement: “How natural does the
description read to you? (For example, could one of your friends
produce such a description?)”. This should tell us something about
the human-likeness of the descriptions produced. After all, a
description may be effective yet unlike anything that a human
speaker is likely to produce. The third aspect was quality, defined
using the statement: “Suppose you did not know this person, how
good would you find the description? (Does it give a good idea
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of what sort of person it is or was?)”. We felt it important to
assess this because an addressee may not know the referent, in
which case the number of successfully identified referents (our
first metric) misses the point.
5.1. Algorithms/Models Considered during
Evaluation
Computational algorithms were tested along with two types of
human-produced descriptions. The first were short descriptions
available in DBpedia. Most entities in DBpedia contain the
property description, which is comparable to the first line in a
Wikipedia article describing an entity. Where the description was
not available in DBpedia, we used the first line in Wikipedia (not
counting the dates of birth and death).
The second type of human-produced descriptions were
created specifically by a native English speaker. A postgraduate
student with experience in natural language processing was given
a set of 100 names and asked to create English descriptions
matching the scenario presented to the participants. That is,
the student was asked to produce descriptions of the names so
that other US/UK people can guess who the described person
is. The student was not aware of the aims of our research but
had access to external resources (e.g., the World Wide Web),
to ensure that he was able to create descriptions for all entities
and not only the ones known to him. We will talk about the
“algorithm” DBP when referring to DBpedia descriptions and
about the “algorithm” Human when referring to the descriptions
produced by the student.
The IA is often used as a reference point against which other
algorithms are compared. However, the performance of the IA
depends crucially on the chosen preference order. To find a
good preference order, we used the semantically annotated part
of the corpus described in Section 3. The annotation is similar
to the annotation of the TUNA corpus (van Deemter et al.,
2012). The preference order was found by taking the annotated
properties and ordering them by their frequency from the most
to the least frequent attribute. This method has been used by
a number of researchers (e.g., Koolen et al., 2012; van Deemter
et al., 2012). The first 10 attributes of the preference order were
type, occupation, nationality, country, starring, author, known for,
genre, gender, death cause.
Given the above, we set out to compare 5 classes of
descriptions: the ones generated by the algorithms Alg1 and
Alg2 the one generated by IA (with the preference order as
stipulated), and finally the two human-produced descriptions
DBP and Human.
“Descriptions” produced by a computer algorithm
are nothing more than a list of properties. To allow
participants to judge descriptions in a natural way,
we felt that these rather formal descriptions had to be
converted into real English text. For example, the property
〈writerOf:The Pit and the Pendulum〉 can be
written as “the writer of The Pit and the Pendulum.” We
created a program that converted properties from DBpedia into
English using predefined mappings from properties to strings.
All descriptions were post-edited by a native English speaker
with experience in linguistics to remove any redundancies in
the descriptions and to improve the fluency of the generated
descriptions. The English speaker was not involved in the
research and had no awareness of its aims.
Our null hypothesis is that “there are no differences between
algorithms in terms of the numbers of correctly identified referents,”
and similarly, “there are no differences between algorithms
in terms of their naturalness and quality.” We expected the
descriptions produced by Human to perform best, as their
descriptions are likely to contain enough information to
unambiguously identify the referent. The descriptions extracted
from DBpedia (algorithm DBP) are likely to perform poorly in
terms of identification, as they are often quite general (e.g., “a
famous English writer”).
5.2. Materials for Evaluating the Model
The names of targets were selected from two websites with lists
of names of famous people7. We selected 100 names that were
not used in our pilot experiments. The evaluation therefore
contained 100 names and 500 descriptions in total, given that
each referent was described using 5 sources:Alg1,Alg2, IA,DBP
and Human.
We used a repeated-measures Latin square design in which
each participant viewed a number of descriptions generated
by each algorithm (within-subject design). To avoid presenting
participants with too many descriptions, the 100 names were
randomly assigned to 4 groups of 25. Each group was arranged
into a Latin square so that each participant judged 5 descriptions
generated by each of the 5 sources (25 descriptions per
participant). Furthermore, each description was viewed three
times, each time by a different participant.
The order in which descriptions were viewed might bias the
results (e.g., seeing a description of Albert Einstein might make it
easier to guess Niels Bohr), therefore the order of the descriptions
was randomized for every participant. Each description was
viewed by three participants.
5.3. Participants and Procedure for
Evaluating the Model
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the University of Aberdeen Handbook For
Research Governance and approved by the College of Physical
Sciences Ethics Review Board. Participants were informed that
their participation was completely voluntary and that they could
withdraw from the survey at any time for any reason. Participants
were informed that the information was used solely for research
purposes. No personal information would be shared with any
third party. Participants who agreed with the conditions could
proceed with the experiment.
The evaluation involved 60 participants (37 male, 22 female
and 1 unspecified). In terms of highest achieved education,
26 of the participants had high school, 26 participants had an
undergraduate degree and 8 participants had a postgraduate
degree. Participants took on average 28min to complete the task.
7www.biographyonline.net/people/famous-100.html and www.whoismore
famous.com/?fulllist=1 last retrieved 21st August 2015.
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Once again, participants were recruited using MTurk. The
experiment was advertised only to US MTurk workers who had
at least 85% success rate (at least 85% of tasks that a worker
submitted in the past were deemed acceptable by the requester).
The reason for advertising only to US workers was to maximize
the overlap between the knowledge of the participants and the
knowledge captured by DBpedia. The famous people employed
as target referents are famous in western culture, particularly in
the US. The selection criteria ensured that participants were from
essentially the same population as the participants who created
the corpus of Section 3.
Participants were directed to a website that provided
instructions. Participants were asked to provide some
demographic information (age group, interests, etc.). After
submitting this information, participants were shown detailed
instructions on how to fill in their answers. After clicking on a
button the first description appeared on the screen (Figure 5).
Participants had to judge the description and fill in the name
of the referent if they could. The two judgment questions were:
“How natural does the description read to you? (For example, could
one of your friends produce such a description?)” and “Suppose
you did not know this person, how good would you find the
description? (Does it give a good idea of what sort of person it
is or was?)”. These two judgments are referred to as naturalness
and quality respectively. Participants provided ratings by moving
sliders (similarly to Gatt et al., 2009). The sliders corresponding
to each statement were set to themiddle position and participants
gave their judgment by moving each slider along the horizontal
axis. The numerical values corresponding to the sliders were
1–100, but participants were not shown the number. If a
participant wished to leave the slider in the middle (value 50),
they had to tick the corresponding check box below the slider.
This was done to prevent participants from accidentally leaving
the slider in its original position without intending to offer a
judgment.
Clicking the button “Next” sent participants to a page with the
description and the name of the described person. Participants
then had to choose their response from one of the options in
Figure 6. The options were mutually exclusive and were used to
gain more insight into the features of the descriptions that were
produced:
Option 1 indicates successful identification. It was also used
to filter out participants who did not take the task seriously. Any
participant who provided a wrong name and selected this option
was removed from the result set (as they were shown the correct
name). The names provided by participants were checked against
the actual referent names.
Option 2 was included for participants who experienced the
“tip-of-the-tongue” event (ToT, Brown and McNeill, 1966). This
option accounted only for about 3% of answers (Kutlak et al.,
2013).
Option 3 accounts for situation where the algorithm selects
information that is not known by listeners. If an algorithm
generates descriptions that frequently lead to this situation, the
FIGURE 5 | Presentation of descriptions in the evaluation. Participants provided judgment of each description by moving the sliders. The box at the bottom of
the page was used for providing the name.
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FIGURE 6 | Options shown to participants after guessing the name of the described person.
algorithm is probably selecting properties that are too difficult for
people to recall (e.g., dates or numbers).
Option 4 was added to avoid lowering the score of good
descriptions where participants do not know the target.
Option 5 covers situations in which some of the properties
in the description are not true of the target (i.e., a participant
believes to have knowledge that contradicts the information in
the description).
Option 6 accounts for situations where an algorithm selects
too few properties or where the selected properties are too
general. For example, describing a target as this person is an actor
is unlikely to allow identification of the target.
The participants had the chance to provide any other reason
for not being able to identify the target (option 7) as well as
providing comments.
6. RESULTS OF EVALUATING THE MODEL
Table 6 contains frequencies of selected answers for each
algorithm. Two answers were not saved due to a technical
error. The χ2 test compares the observed frequencies with
expected frequencies based on the totals in each row and column.
In order to focus on the differences in numbers of correctly
identified referents, participants’ answers were collated into two
categories: correct and incorrect. Responses where participants
did not know the referent were removed from the analysis.Where
participants selected the Tip of the Tongue (ToT) option, they
failed to provide the name of the referent, yet they did have
the right person in mind; because this makes it difficult to say
whether these answers were correct, we excluded them from
our analysis. Table 7 shows the collapsed counts where Incorrect
Identification is the sum of the figures in the categories Unknown
TABLE 6 | Counts of selected answers for individual algorithms in the final
evaluation.
DBP IA Alg1 Alg2 Human Total
Correct identification 68 58 89 100 180 495
Tip-of-the-Tongue (ToT) 21 17 24 24 28 114
Unknown target 44 64 61 61 51 281
Unknown properties 55 136 106 94 33 424
Underspecified 104 21 7 10 2 144
At odds with my information 2 3 8 6 3 22
Other 6 1 5 4 2 18
Total 300 300 300 299 299 1498
DBP are descriptions from DBpedia, IA is the Incremental Algorithm, Alg1 is the new
algorithm that always selects three properties, Alg2 is the new algorithm that uses
document retrieval as a termination heuristic and Human are descriptions produced by a
native English speaker.
Properties, Underspecified, At odds with my information, and
Other.
As we can see from the table, the descriptions generated by
an English speaker outperform every other algorithm. The effect
of algorithms was tested using the χ2 statistics with the numbers
from Table 7. The null hypothesis was rejected as the test showed
significant differences: χ2
(4)
= 176.8, p < 0.001. Post-hoc pairwise
comparison shows statistically significant differences between
algorithms IA and Alg2 [χ2
(1)
= 18.3, p < 0.001], IA and Alg1
[χ2
(1)
= 10.1, p < 0.005] and Alg2 and Human [χ2
(1)
= 56.8, p <
0.001].
Even though no description contained the full name of the
corresponding referent, some descriptions still contained a “clue”
in the form of a property containing a part of the referent’s name.
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For example, John Lennon was described as “This person wrote
I Know I Know and was the topic of the musical Lennon.” In
most cases, clues were the names of relatives (e.g., “the spouse of
Victoria Beckham,” “relative of Earl Woods”) or names of related
entities (“a member of The Jackson 5,” “the creator of The Cosby
Show”).
To show the differences between the algorithms more clearly,
we removed descriptions of all referents that contained such
clues. This was the case for 29 out of the 100 entities and
a total of 346 name guesses. Table 8 contains the counts of
correctly and incorrectly identified referents on the resulting
subset of name guesses. The numbers of correctly identified
referents differed significantly between the algorithms tested
χ2
(4)
= 119, p < 0.001. Post-hoc pairwise comparison resulted
in the homogeneous subsets in Table 9.
The results show a difference between algorithms Alg2 and
Alg1, suggesting that the content-based termination heuristic
might increase the chances of successful identification. Note,
however, that the difference was not statistically significant and
more investigation is required to investigate this issue.
Table 10 shows mean naturalness and quality for each
algorithm. While the differences in naturalness are small, the
algorithms seem to differ substantially in terms of quality.
Because each description was viewed 3 times, the data were
aggregated so that the naturalness and quality ratings for each
TABLE 7 | Counts of correctly and incorrectly identified referents.
DBP IA Alg1 Alg2 Human Total
Correct identification 68 58 89 100 180 495
Incorrect identification 167 161 126 114 40 608
Total 235 219 215 214 220 1103
Proportion correct 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.47 0.82 0.45
Proportion incorrect 0.71 0.74 0.59 0.53 0.18 0.55
Correct/incorrect 0.41 0.36 0.71 0.88 4.50 0.81
The table also shows the proportions as well as the ration of correctly and incorrectly
identified referents.
TABLE 8 | Counts of correctly and incorrectly identified referents when
descriptions that contained a clue as to the identity of the referent were
removed.
DBP IA Alg1 Alg2 Human Total
Correct identification 44 41 49 63 123 320
Incorrect identification 112 110 97 86 32 437
Total 156 151 146 149 155 757
Proportion correct 0.28 0.27 0.34 0.42 0.79 0.42
Proportion incorrect 0.72 0.73 0.66 0.58 0.21 0.58
Correct/incorrect 0.39 0.37 0.51 0.73 3.84 0.73
The table also shows the proportions as well as the ratio of correctly and incorrectly
identified referents.
description were created by taking the mean of the 3 ratings. We
performed two one-way analyses of variance with ALGORITHM
as the independent variable. The main effect of ALGORITHM
was significant on naturalness [F(4, 495) = 4.576, p < 0.005] and
on quality [F(4, 495) = 40.23, p < 0.001]. Tables 11, 12 show
homogeneous subsets for quality and naturalness calculated by
post-hoc Tukey test. Algorithms that do not share a letter are
TABLE 9 | Homogeneous subsets for counts of correctly identified
referents.
Algorithm Correct Total
Human A 123 155
Alg2 B 63 149
Alg1 B C 49 146
DBP C 44 156
IA C 41 151
Algorithms that do not share a letter are significantly different with p < 0.05.
TABLE 10 | Mean ratings and standard deviations for quality and
naturalness for each algorithm in the final evaluation.
DBP IA Alg1 Alg2 Human
Mean quality 43.570 57.857 67.600 66.786 77.552
Quality SD 27.385 20.630 16.670 18.051 15.570
Mean naturalness 61.953 61.927 62.110 61.495 70.311
Naturalness SD 18.587 17.294 17.758 18.655 15.556
Quality refers to the statement: “Suppose you did not know this person, how good would
you find the description?” and naturalness refers to the statement: “How natural does the
description read to you?”
TABLE 11 | Homogeneous subsets for quality calculated using post-hoc
Tukey test.
Algorithm Mean quality SD
Human A 77.6 15.6
Alg2 B 66.8 18.1
Alg1 B 67.6 16.7
IA C 57.9 20.6
DBP D 43.6 27.4
Algorithms that do not share a letter are significantly different at p < 0.05.
TABLE 12 | Homogeneous subsets for naturalness calculated using a
post-hoc Tukey test.
Algorithm Mean naturalness SD
Human A 70.3 15.6
Alg2 B 61.5 18.7
Alg1 B 62.1 17.8
IA B 61.9 17.3
DBP B 62.0 18.6
Algorithms that do not share a letter are significantly different at p < 0.05
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statistically different with p < 0.05. As we can see, the human-
produced descriptions were rated highest. The analysis suggests
that descriptions produced by the new algorithms have higher
“quality” than the ones produced by the IA and DBpedia.
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our computational model addresses what we believe to be an
interesting variant of the much-studied problem of reference
production. The model does a better job addressing its task—
producing descriptions of famous people to an unknown
audience—than the Incremental Algorithm, both in terms of the
numbers of correctly identified referents and in terms of the
perceived quality of the descriptions generated. The structure
of the model differs sharply from earlier ones. This is not only
true in comparison to the algorithms proposed in practical
Computational Linguistics (of which Siddharthan et al., 2011,
developed in a context of automatic text summarization, is a
good example), but also in comparison to algorithms developed
in the tradition of REG. To ensure that our contributions are
understood properly, it is worth re-stating some features of our
approach.
Although some previous models of referring were constructed
for situations in which hearers know less than speakers (Garoufi
and Koller, 2014b; Paraboni and van Deemter, 2014b), these
models assume that the speaker knows what the hearer knows.
In many situations, however, speakers do not possess this
information, for example when a journalist writes a newspaper
article or a scientist a journal paper. Our model targets situations
of this kind, where the key to success lies in the model’s ability to
make an educated guess concerning the knowledge of the reader.
Additionally, we argue that these situations require that a guess
is made about what information is likely to be distinctive for the
hearer, and how much information the reader is likely to require.
Our model differs from earlier REG models because all three
heuristics composing our model make use of pre-existing open-
source data, rather than information that is hand crafted by
researchers interested in reference. We believe that this lends
additional interest to our model, because hand-crafting might
accidentally benefit some algorithms over others. The use of
open-source data is now well established in Computational
Linguistics, but it has not been applied to the generation of
referring expressions before.
Note, furthermore, that some key features of existing REG
algorithms do not feature in our model. For example, since
termination cannot be based on the criterion most often
employed in REG (namely, that all distractors have been
removed), we have had to find a different approach to this
problem (Section 4.3). Similar observations can be made about
discriminatory power (DP), a concept that had to be combined
with information retrieval techniques to make it applicable to a
situation in which the set of distractors is not know, andmodified
in light of the frequencies found in our data.
Some difficult questions are worth raising briefly. First, does
our model have psychological reality, or is it merely a product
model in the sense of Section 2? On the one hand, it is clearly a
product model, since our final evaluation (Section 5) looked only
at the output of the model, disregarding the actual production
process. On the other hand, our tests of the individual heuristics
do suggest that human speakers would be able to carry out these
tests. Consider the Knowledge Heuristic, for example. Speakers
evidently do not use Google to perform the kind of tests of which
this heuristic makes use. Yet it may not be entirely implausible
that speakers encounter, over the course of their lives, a large
amount of text that is in some ways similar to (a suitable part
of) the world-wide web, consequently considering the web as
a model of human knowledge might not be ridiculous. The
Knowledge Heuristic is no perfect model of human speaking, but
it may be our best tool for capturing one aspect of it. Similar
things might be said about Unexpectedness and Termination.
Should the Knowledge Heuristic be seen as a model of
Common Ground? The experiment in Section 4.1 did not look
at deeper levels of epistemic embedding (as in the classic notion
of Common Ground of Section 1): at most, this experiment
established that the heuristic predicts (approximately) what
hearers know. On the other hand, if it is true, as is generally
assumed, that reference rests on Common Ground, then our final
evaluation—which suggests that the descriptions generated are
effective and at least somewhat natural—suggests that, despite
its relative simplicity, the Knowledge Heuristic makes reasonable
predictions concerning (communal) Common Ground itself.
An example may make this clearer. Suppose it is debatable
who invented the printing press: most Americans believe that
this was done by Mr. X, but most Chinese believe it was done by
Mr. Y . An American speaker who addresses a Chinese audience
might choose, politely, to refer to Mr. Y (i.e., the Chinese
scientist) as “the inventor of the printing press.” However, if
her Chinese audience knows the speaker to be American, then
they might misunderstand this description as referring to Mr. X
(the American scientist), because they know that this is who the
speaker believes the inventor of the printing press to be. Perhaps
the success of our model can be seen as confirmation of Clark’s
idea that communal Common Ground tells us something about
“real” (i.e., epistemically complex) Common Ground, and not
just about a speaker’s assessment of a hearer’s knowledge.
Even though we have focussed on the production of referring
expressions, it appears to us that elements of our proposal can
be put to other uses. Consider Common Ground, for instance.
To the extent that our Knowledge Heuristic is able to predict
what facts a member of a particular community is likely to know,
it is potentially relevant for many areas, such as journalism,
advertising, and creative writing, because in all these areas it is
important to assess what an unknown hearer is likely to know.
In a computational setting, the Knowledge heuristic is
applicable to a key problem that arises in many Information
Presentation systems, namely to decide what information should
be provided to the user. In Natural Language Generation, this
is known as the problem of general Content Selection (Reiter
and Dale, 2000). This time the Knowledge Heuristic could be
“used in reverse,” selecting information that is least (rather
than most) likely to be known, hence most worthy of being
added to the reader’s store of information (cf., Section 2.3,
where Information Sharing is discussed). Similar observations
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can be made about the other two factors explored in our model.
For example, many Content Selection approaches in Natural
Language Generation aim to select interesting information; our
Unexpectedness Heuristics could help.
Having said this, we acknowledge that we have merely put the
first step on the road to understanding how the different factors
may be estimated. For example, one could test the performance
of our heuristics in specialist domains, for instance involving
an audience of experts in some area of public life (say, football,
or ballet), if a corpus of texts representing the knowledge of
this audience can be found. Likewise, it would be interesting
to investigate how the model fares at describing companies or
geographic locations (rather than famous people).
A difficult question is how our approach might generalize
to more complex types of information. At least in its
implementation detail, the approach is difficult to extend to
logically complex information: it is one thing to search a set of
documents for the fact that Ernest Hemingway was American,
for instance, (an atomic fact) than to search for the fact that he
wrote three novels, or that he wrotemore novels than short stories.
This information may well be part of the Common Ground of a
given community, but our computational model is not yet able to
find it.
On a final, theoretical note, our Knowledge Heuristic can be
seen as a first step toward a computational model of Herb Clark’s
Communal CommonGround. Our approach suggests, moreover,
that it might be useful to extend the notion of Common Ground
beyond its original conception, taking into account not only what
speakers and hearers know, but also what they are interested in.
After all, in communication, the interlocutors’ interests are as
important as their knowledge.
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